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INTRODUCTION
At least since the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Va-
leo,' the constitutionality of campaign finance reform legislation has
been among the most controversial and heated in First Amendment
jurisprudence.2 Those who believe in the necessity of reducing the
importance of economic power in the political process have long ar-
gued that such reform actually fosters, rather than deters, free speech
interests by opening political communication to those with less
money.' They further argue that concerns of equality and systemic
integrity more than justify whatever negative impact such reform may
have on free speech interests. 4 Indeed, some have gone so far as to
assert, purely as a conceptual matter, that the contribution or expen-
diture of money involves the non-expressive exercise of property
. Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University.
This article will appear in Professor Redish's forthcoming book. Mon.y Talks: Sperth, anomzr
Powe, and the Values of Democrat) from New York University Press. The author would like to
thank Tracy LeRoy of the Class of 2002 at Northwestern University School of Law for her valu-
able research assistance.
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2 There were some of us who recognized the troubling implications of campaign finance
reform for the First Amendment right of free expression long before the decision in BudHek.
Sep, e.g., RALPH K. WINTER, JR., CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND POLn'ICAL FREEDOM (1973) (suggest-
ing that limitations on campaign financing could limit freedom of expression); Robert A. Bicks
& Howard I. Friedman, R gu/ation of Federal Elkion Finante: A Case of Misguidtd Morality. 28
N.Y.U. L REV. 975 (1953) (discussing the ever increasing importance of money in political
campaigns and arguing for the repeal of certain limitations on campaign finance); Martin H.
Redish, Campaign SpendingLaws and theFirt Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L RE%. 900 (1971) (arguing
that rather than limiting the amount of money that can be spent on campaigns. which may re-
strict freedom of expression, reform should focus on reducing the importance of financial re-
sources in campaigns).
4 See discussion infra Part II, Postulate 5.
Se e.g., JOHN RAMIS, POLTICA LIBERAUiSM 358-63 (1993) (arguing that regulation of
spending in campaigns establishes a fair value of political liberties); Burt Neuborne, To ard a
Democrac)Centered Readingof the First Amendment, 93 NW. U. L RE%. 1055. 1071-73 (1999) (listing
four negative impacts of unregulated campaign financing); see also Part II. Postulates 5-6.
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rights, rather than the exercise of protected rights of expression.' In
response, others have argued that campaign finance and free expres-
sion are inherently intertwined, and that proposed and enacted re-
forms will inevitably and fatally invade First Amendment rights.6
To this point, it would be difficult to declare a clear winner. In-
deed, the Supreme Court's decisions on the subject have not only
failed to provide a coherent resolution of the competing and com-
plex arguments, but have instead themselves given rise to substantial
doctrinal and theoretical confusion. Purely on the level of social and
political policy, at least, the Court's doctrinal framework may right-
fully be accused of creating a pragmatic nightmare that not only re-
fuses to permit the establishment of a clear, consistent, and coherent
campaign finance policy, but actually exacerbates the supposed social
harms of the current system of finance regulation.
Just this past term, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC," the
Court continued to operate in its severely confused doctrinal and
theoretical state. There the Court upheld Missouri's highly restrictive
limitations on campaign contributions, stubbornly adhering to the
contorted distinctions first adopted in Buckley.9 The Court in Nixon
even compounded the intellectually and pragmatically dubious as-
pects of that earlier opinion by giving it a grudgingly restrictive inter-
pretation.' ° The two concurring opinions in Nixon, authored by jus-
tices Stevens" and Breyer,'2 significantly added to the decision's
problematic nature. 3
One could seek to attack the seemingly intractable problems of
campaign finance reform in a variety of ways. One conceivable strat-
egy would be to provide a mercilessly detailed normative critique of
all of the technical loopholes that currently plague campaign finance
regulation, from "soft money" 4 to "bundling."5 This, however, is not
See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2000) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ("Money is property; it is not speech."); Cass R_ Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1391-99 (1994) (noting non-speech arguments favoring
campaign finance reform); see also Part II, Postulate 1.
See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money & Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985) (asserting that restrictions on campaign
spending puts First Amendment rights at risk); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Un-
democratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996) (challenging the
notion that campaign finance regulation promotes equality).
See discussion infra notes 54-59, 83-91 and accompanying text.
120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
9 Id. at 903-10; see discussion infra notes 8-91 and accompanying text.10 Id. at 909.
1 Id. at 910 (Stevens,j., concurring).
12 Id. at 910-14 (BreyerJ., concurring).
I See discussion infra notes 69-82, 93-101 and accompanying text.
14 The term, "soft money" refers to "sums that... may be given without limit by individuals,
PACs [political action committees], and even corporations, and labor unions.., to political
parties for purposes of grass roots 'party-building' activities." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political
Money and Freedom of Speec4 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 663, 668 (1997).
Bundling occurs when a person "collect[s] several individual contributions of one thou-
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the approach employed here. What the constitutional controversy
over campaign finance reform needs most at this point is clarity and
simplicity. Given the generally confusing and unsatisfying nature of
the Court's recent decision in Nixon, efforts to provide such clarity
are needed now more than ever.
It is possible, I believe, to clarify this controversy by carefully dis-
secting and deconstructing the case for the constitutionality of cam-
paign finance reform. That case may be reduced to a series of em-
pirical or theoretical postulates that together provide the normative
foundation for the argument that campaign finance reform is consis-
tent with First Amendment dictates. Detailed examination of these
assertions, I submit, reveals the serious flaws--either conceptual, em-
pirical, or logical-in the entire case for the constitutionality of cam-
paign finance reform. By describing the postulates that underlie the
campaign finance reform argument and simultaneously pointing out
the fatal errors that plague each of them, one will be able to explain
why campaign finance reform measures-including both those which
have been held constitutional and unconstitutional by the Court-
must be found to violate core notions of free expression. My goal
here is to do just that.
I have been able to discern six key postulates that, taken together,
make up the core of the argument in support of the constitutionality
of campaign finance restrictions. This is not to suggest that all cam-
paign finance reform advocates necessarily adhere to all six. Con-
ceivably, some would endorse all of them, others would believe that
one or more of the postulates represents an unwarranted theoretical
compromise, while still others would believe that one or more go fur-
ther than necessary to justify needed campaign finance regulation.
Generally speaking, however, I believe it is accurate to assert that
some combination or permutation of these six postulates make up
the core case for the constitutionality of campaign finance reform.
The postulates underlying the case for the constitutionality of
campaign finance reform are as follows:
1. The expenditure of money involves the exercise of property rights,
not rights of free expression.
2. To the extent that one chooses to classify the expenditure of money as
a form of protected expression at all, contributions to political campaigns
at best represent only a marginally protected form of expression.
3. Thejudiciary should generally defer to legislative judgments in ruling
upon the wisdom and/or necessity of campaign finance regulation.
4. The free speech attack on campaign finance regulation is erroneously
grounded exclusively in a misguided individualist/libertarian rationale
for free speech protection, rather than a more appropriate communi-
sand dollars each and turn[s] over the entire sum to the candidate. PAC. or parti-akng po-
litical credit for a much larger amount than she personally could hae contributed. Ild
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tarian-based rationale.
5. Limitations on campaign expenditures and contributions are neces-
sary to remove inequities among economically disparate groups and indi-
viduals, in furtherance of First Amendment-based principles of equality.
6. Limitations on campaign expenditures and contributions are neces-
sary to prevent corruption of the political process, both real and per-
ceived.
Each of these postulates, I believe, can be shown to be seriously
flawed, from either logical, empirical, or theoretical perspectives. By
describing and then attacking each of these postulates, one should be
able to demonstrate the serious constitutional defects in much of the
existing structure of campaign finance regulation, as well as in most
proposed reforms. For if all-or even most-of these postulates can
be shown to be false or misguided, then the foundation for the con-
stitutional defense of campaign finance regulation will almost cer-
tainly crumble.
The first Section of this Article briefly describes the current fed-
eral statutory framework of campaign finance regulation, as well as
the current state of Supreme Court doctrine on the constitutionality
of campaign finance regulation. 6 It points out the hopeless state of
practical and theoretical confusion that plagues the Court's deci-
sions. The next Section seeks initially to describe the strongest case
in support of each of the six postulates, and then proceeds to detail
the serious flaws in each one.' The Section that follows considers the
possibility of an altemative method of campaign finance reform that
might satisfy First Amendment dictates.'S
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: THE EXISTING STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In response to growing concern over the role played by economic
power in the political process, Congress passed and the President
signed into law the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971.'o
The act required disclosure of candidate and committee spending
and placed limits on both expenditures in and contributions to con-
gressional campaigns.0 In reaction to the revelations of the Water-
gate scandal, in 1974 Congress enacted comprehensive amendments
containing further restrictions.' Two years later, in Buckley v. Valeo,22
16 See infra Part 1.
7 See infra Part II.
See infra Conclusion.
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
20 Id.; see also ROBERT K. GOIDEL ET AL, MONEY MATTERS: CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS 2 (1999) (noting that the 1971 Act required greater
disclosure of candidate and committee spending).
21 Federal Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)
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the Supreme Court simultaneously upheld contribution limits and
held expenditure limits unconstitutional,23 effectively destroying the
coherence of the legislative scheme.2 ' By leaving expenditures unre-
stricted but upholding severe restrictions on campaign contributions,
the Court effectively-if unintentionally-increased the prac-
tical importance of individual candidate wealth.
Today, the regulatory framework is largely the product of a syn-
thesis of the 1971 Act, the 1974 legislation, and Supreme Court-
dictated constitutional restrictions. Under that crazy-quilt frame-
work, individuals may not contribute in excess of $1000 (in aggre-
gate) to any candidate or her authorized political committees for
each election.25 For purposes of contributions, primary elections for
a party's nomination are distinguished from the general election for
the office. Thus, an individual may contribute $1000 to each!l A
person may not contribute more than $20,000 in any calendar year to
the political committees established and maintained by a national po-
litical party.8 Moreover, an individual may not contribute more than
$5000 to any other political committee in any calendar year.! No in-
dividual may make campaign contributions aggregating more than
$25,000 in any calendar year.' Any contribution made to a candidate
in a year other than the calendar year in which the election is held is
considered to have been made during the calendar year of the elec-
tion.3
Political action committees (PACs) may not make contributions in
excess of $5000 to any candidate or to her authorized political com-
mittee.' PACs may not contribute more than $15,000 to the national
political committees in any calendar year, and may not contribute
more than $5000 to any other PAC in any calendar year." These limi-
tations do not apply to transfers of money between national, state,
district, or local political committees of the same political party."
A contribution made in cooperation or consultation with a candi-
date, his authorized political committee, or his agent, or any contri-
bution made at the suggestion or request of the candidate, his
authorized political committee, or his agent is considered to be a
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
22 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3 Id at 143.
24 See discussion infra notes 54-59, 83-91 and accompan)ing tXL
2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994).
26 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1994).
2-1Id
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (B).
2 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (C).
so 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (3).
1 /d.
2 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2) (A).
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2) (B)-(C).
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (4).
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contribution to the candidate. 3 Contributions made for the benefit
of a candidate for the office of Vice President of the United States are
considered contributions to the candidate of that party for the office
of President.
6
If a presidential campaign wishes to receive matching public
funds, the candidate is limited to expenditures of $10 million in the
primary campaign and $20 million in the general election." The na-
tional committee of a political party may not make any expenditure
in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for
president that exceeds an amount equal to two cents multiplied by
the voting age population.s' The national committee of a political
party, or a state committee, may not make any expenditure in con-
nection with the general election campaign of a candidate of senator
or representative of a state that is entitled to only one representative
in excess of two cents multiplied by the voting age population of the
United States or $20,000, or $10,000 if the candidate is running for
representative, delegate, or resident commissioner.39 Amounts total-
ing not more than $17,500 may be contributed to a senatorial candi-
date for a primary or general election during the year of the election
by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
or the national committee of a political party, or any combination of
the two.
40
Until early 2001, recent efforts to fortify existing federal campaign
finance regulation have stalled. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 199941 (commonly known as the McCain-Feingold legislation)
was placed on the Senate calendar in October 1999,' but saw no seri-
ous movement until March, 2001. 43 The bill would heavily restrict
parties and candidates from accepting soft money contributions and
strengthen disclosure laws." However, Senator McCain proposed an
amended version of the bill.45 The amendment called for disclosure
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (7) (A).2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (7) (C).
37 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1).
38 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d).
39 Id.
40 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h).
41 S. 1593, 106th Cong. (1999). The similar Shays-Meehan legislation passed in the House,
H.R. 417, 106th Cong. (1999), was referred to the Senate without further action. 145 CONG.
REC. Sl1,638 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1999).
42 145 CONG. REc. S12,550-51 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1999).
43 Dan Balz & Ruth Marcus, Bush to Offer Campaign Finance Guidelines, WASH. POST, Mar. 15,
2001, at A4. As this Article went to press, on April 2, 2001, the Senate passed the McCain-
Feingold Bill. S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001); 147 CONG. PEG. S323--61 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001);
Helen Dewar, Senate Passes Bill Revamping Campaign Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2001, at Al. The
bill is now awaiting approval in the House. Helen Dewar, McCain, Feingold Turn to House; Senate
Campaign Finance Champions Push to Match Success, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at A4.
4 S. 1593.
45 Senator McCain introduced his amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001. S. 2549, 106th Cong. (2000), 146 CONG. PEC. 54715 (daily ed. June 7,
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of expenditures and contributors from Section 527 groups, so-called
"stealth PACs," which use a tax code provision to fund election work
with undisclosed and unlimited contributions and claim exemption
from federal taxation and election laws.!' Section 527 provides a tax
exemption to organizations that are primarily involved in elections,
such as PACs, party committees, and campaign committees.' Cur-
rently, under the FECA, these groups do not need to report issue ad-
vocacy contributions; according to Senator McCain, the groups "gain
both the public subsidy of tax exemption and the ability to shield
from the American public the identity of those spending their money
to try to influence our elections." 8 The amendment requires Section
527 groups to file publicly available tax forms and to file with the IRS
or make public reports specifying annual expenditures of over $500
and identifying those who contribute more than $200 annually to the
organization. Notably, the amendment does not place restrictions
on contributions or expenditures, but merely mandates disclosure.
The states generally have more lax campaign finance laws than
does the federal government. Twenty-four states have some provision
for public funding of state legislative campaigns. " Eleven states, in-
cluding California, Texas, and Virginia, have no limits on spending in
campaigns.'5 Fifteen have restrictions similar to federal election laws,
and five, including Florida, Maine, and Washington, have strict regu-
lations involving public funding systems with corresponding restric-
tions on campaign expenditures.' Some states have enacted more
limitations, which may flow from state cultures that are more suppor-
tive of the use of government to promote equality in participation.
The failure of significant reform efforts since the 1974 amend-
ments to the Federal Election Campaign Act is perhaps best ex-
plained by two factors. The first factor is the significant roadblock
imposed by the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo,"' in
2000). The Senate agreed to the amendment, 146 CONG. REC. S4808 (daily ed.June 8, 2000).
but itwas subsequentlywithdrawn. 146 CONG. REc D619 (daily ed.June 29.2000).
Id; 146 CONG REc. S4656 (daily ed.June 7,2000) (statement of Sen. McCain).
47 Political organization is defined as "a party, committee, association, fund, or other organi-
zation (whether or not incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of di-
rectly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures. or both, for an exempt
function." 26 U.S.C. § 527(e) (1) (1994). An exempt function is:
the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, elec-
tion, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or of-
fice in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential elec-
tors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected, nominated, elected, or
appointed.
26 U.S.C. § 527(e) (2).
146 CONG. REc. 4657 (daily ed.June 7, 2000) (statement of Sen. McCain).
49 See supra note 45.
sOIDELETAL, supra note 20, at 170.
51 ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, MONEY RULES: FINANCING ELECTIONS IN AF.RIECA 48-49 (2000).
5Id.
53ld
- 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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which the Court effectively rendered incoherent any effort to control
the importance of economic power in political campaigns. By simul-
taneously holding that expenditure limits violate the First Amend-
ment while contribution limits do not,"5 the Court placed reform ef-
forts between a rock and a hard place. To be sure, reformers may
continue existing restrictions on campaign contributions and per-
haps close up existing loopholes, such as "bundling" or the use of so-
called "soft money."5 But in so doing they may actually be exacerbat-
ing the very economic inequities they purportedly seek to curb. Ac-
cording to one authority, "[t]oday's reform agenda is deeply set in
the ideology of the Populism and Progressivism of the turn of the
[Twentieth] century."5 7 Pursuant to this philosophy, "[t]he task of
regulation was to curb the influence of money and to legislate small-
ness." 8 Since, under Buckley, Congress lacks constitutional authority
to limit campaign expenditures, continued or reinforced limitations
on contributions will inevitably have the effect of increasing the im-
portance of personal wealth: Individuals possessing personal for-
tunes will be able to spend at will on their own campaigns, while
those with fewer personal resources will be unable to combat such
massive use of money, because they will be severely restricted in their
ability to raise funds. Because the Court has at no point indicated a
willingness to reconsider its constitutional bar to expenditure limita-
tions, any reform efforts will necessarily reinforce the inequities
caused by disparities in personal wealth.
The second reason that further reform efforts have largely failed'
may come down to the simple fact of legislator self-interest-what has
55 Id. at 58-59.
56 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 668 (explaining the concepts of "soft money" and "bundling").
The problem of soft money was created by congressional action in 1979, when Congress
amended the 1974 Act in order to permit parties to raise funds without the restrictions of con-
tribution limitations, provided that the funds were set aside for "party building." FRANK J.
SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 149 (1992); see Federal Election Commission, I I C.F.R. §
100.7(b) (1998); HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & ANTHONY CORRADO, FINANCING THE 1992 ELECTION
147-75 (1995) (reviewing the role of soft money played in the 1992 election). According to one
commentator, "[a ] ny limit on party expenditures of soft money would likely be struck down by
the current Court in light of its recent decision that political parties may make unlimited inde-
pendent expenditures on behalf of a particular candidate." Sullivan, supra note 14, at 669.FrankJ. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1348, 1356 (1994).q Id
See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,
618 (1996) (holding that political parties have the First Amendment right to make unlimited
expenditures on behalf of a particular candidate). In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
120 S. Ct. 897, 907 (2000), the Court, in reaffirming Buckley's validation of contribution limits,
distinguished Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee on the grounds that the earlier de-
cision had concerned a challenge to limitations on expenditures.
60 It is true that last year Congress enacted a law expanding campaign contribution disclo-
sure requirements. Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of Title 26 of the United States Code). However, no efforts to expand direct restrictions
on campaign finance have succeeded. As this Article went to press, the Senate passed the
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been referred to as "legislative entrenchment."'' While modern pub-
lic choice theory has long questioned the motivations of legislators in
enacting laws,6 the concern is probably at its greatest when legislative
decisions directly impact upon the likelihood of a legislator's con-
tinuation in office. From this perspective, it is highly doubtful that
legislators will enact laws that strengthen their opponents' chances of
unseating them. A possible explanation for the general failure of fur-
ther campaign finance reform, then, is legislators' concern that such
reform would either weaken their own chances of reelection or
strengthen their opponents' chances of unseating them.
While until recently there has been relatively little movement on
the legislative front, campaign finance reform has continued to cap-
ture the minds of scholars. For example, one scholar, pointing to the
legislative entrenchment problem, has urged that state legislatures be
given responsibility for imposing future regulations on the financing
of federal campaigns.3 Other scholars, proposing even more radical
solutions, have "challenge[d] the conventional assumption that pri-
vate financing of public election campaigns is consistent with the re-
quirements of American constitutional democracy," and in its place
"propose a replacement for this system in the federal context: total
public financing of congressional campaigns." According to yet an-
other scholar, "[e]xtending full public funding with attached spend-
ing limits from presidential to congressional campaigns would be the
most obvious version of... reform, but is probably politically infeasi-
ble."6
Whatever one thinks of the advisability of proposed reforms, there
can be little doubt that-at least in part due to the disruptive impact
of the constitutional barriers imposed in Bucl -existing campaign
finance regulation has not accomplished its stated goals. Between
1977 and 1992, campaign spending for congressional campaigns in-
creased by 347%.' Contributions to congressional campaigns by po-
litical action committees increased from S20.5 million in 1976 to
$189 million in 1994.6 Since 1974, there has been an almost eight-
fold increase in the number of federal political action committees."
The general failure of campaign finance regulation to accomplish its
stated goals will no doubt lead to continued scholarly and political
McCain-Feingold Bill. The Bill is now before the House. See supra note 43.
61 William P. Marshall, The Last Best Ciance for Campaign Finane Refo=, 94 NW%. U L RE%'.
335,339 (2000).
2Eg., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, TheJurispnidte ofPublic Chmoe, 65 TE L REV.
873 (1987).
Marshall, supra note 61, at 376-86.
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperatit and Practical Supenontv of Drao.
cratica/!y nanedEetion, 94 COLU.1. L REV. 1160,1160 (1994).
Sullivan, supra note 14, at 669.
Smith, supra note 6, at 1050.
C7I&
63 Id. at 1050-51.
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pressure to attain those goals. As noted at the outset, however, those
who advocate such reform-to the extent that they consider the im-
plications of the First Amendment guarantee of free expression at
all-proceed on a number of core assumptions about both the nature
of the First Amendment right and the harms caused by an unregu-
lated system. If those core assumptions can be shown to be flawed on
either empirical or theoretical grounds, however, the First Amend-
ment defense of campaign finance limitations crumbles. The pur-
pose of the section that follows is to detail those core assumptions,
and to explain the serious flaws in each.
II. THE FLAWED POSTULATES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Postulate 1: The Use of Money in Political Campaigns Implicates
Property Rights, Not First Amendment Rights
While those who believe campaign finance regulation is constitu-
tional often concede that such regulation at some level implicates
ights of free expression, others refuse even to make that concession.
Regulation of the use of money in political campaigns, Justice Stevens
recently argued in his separate opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, implicates solely the exercise of property rightsY'
Viewing the use of money in political campaigns from this perspective
effectively disposes of any constitutional barriers to campaign finance
regulation, because in enforcing property rights, protected under the
heavily diluted substantive due process protections of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments,0 the courts defer broadly to legislative
choices.
As Buckle 7 and subsequent decisions72 make clear, a majority of
the Supreme Court has never accepted so narrow a constitutional
perspective. Those who believe that only property rights are impli-
cated have suggested that Buckley and its progeny are reminiscent of
the long-discredited decision in Lochner v. New York,7" where the Court
effectively substituted its own economic philosophy for that of the
New York Legislature in holding the state's maximum hours laws to
be an unconstitutional interference with the right of contract. 74
6 120 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2000) (Stevens,J, concurring).
70 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. When property rights are involved,legislative regulation will be found unconstitutional solely when the Court finds the legislation
to fail the rational basis test, a standard that is virtually never satisfied. E.g., West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).71 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
72 E.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604
(1996).
73 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
74 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1397 ("In rejecting the claim that controls on financial ex-
penditures could be justified as a means of promoting political equality, Buckley seems highly
reminiscent of the pre-New Deal period. Indeed Buckley might well be seen as the modern-day
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Of course, it is not essential that one adopt the property rights
theory in order to conclude that campaign finance regulation is con-
stitutional. One could conceivably acknowledge that First Amend-
ment rights are implicated by such regulation but nevertheless con-
clude that the compelling interests served justify what otherwise
would contravene the free speech guarantee." But surely it would
not be an understatement to assert that acceptance of the property
rights view would significantly reduce the constitutional barriers to
campaign finance regulation. Indeed, acceptance of the property
rights perspective would undoubtedly lead to a finding of constitu-
tionality. Perhaps more importantly, even if one did not accept the
property rights view completely, one could conceivably adopt it par-
tially, reasoning that the presence of money somehow dilutes the
level of First Amendment protection involved. Thus before one can
hope to challenge the constitutionality of campaign finance regula-
tion, one must respond to the property rights approach.
This is not a difficult task, at least to the extent one seeks to re-
spond solely to the full blown version of the property rights theory.
To be sure, on a certain level both the expenditure and contribution
of money for purposes of use in a political campaign do not involve
the direct exercise of the power of expression. When viewed nar-
rowly, the acts in question can be considered to be pure financial
conduct People are transferring funds, not communicating. But so
artificially truncated a view of the process completely misses the fun-
damental point, and in so doing seriously threatens core free speech
values by ignoring their presence. The simple and obvious fact is that
both the expenditures and contributions are physical acts done as
part of the facilitative or catalytic process, thereby making communi-
cation possible.
The point can best be understood by means of analogy. Imagine
the following laws: (1) one that prohibits the payment of money for
books or newspapers; (2) one that prohibits publishers from paying
their workers who print or distribute the final product; and (3) one
that prohibits would-be picketers from purchasing material to be
used in signs or sound amplification equipment. Assume that none
of the hypothetical laws in any wvay prohibits or penalizes the specific
acts of expression-for example, the distribution of the books or
newspapers or the act of actually picketing. Nevertheless, there can
be little doubt that the laws in question violate the First Amendment
guarantee of free expression. Under these circumstances, protection
of the narrowly defined right of communication is a hollow protec-
tion indeed: The expenditure of money is a necessary precondition
to the meaningful exercise of the expressive right. The same is obvi-
ously true of the use of money in the course of a political campaign.
analogue of the infamous and discredited case of Lodier v. Xn' )o&,. . . .".
15 This is aview, however, that I reject. Scediscussion infra pp. 813-14.
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In such a situation, either directly or indirectly, the expenditure of
money is essential to the ability of a candidate to convey her message
to the electorate.
The property rights perspective focuses solely on the narrow act of
financial transfer, and concludes that such an act involves exclusively
the exercise of property rights. But both practical reality and First
Amendment theory make clear that such a narrow focus dangerously
distorts the First Amendment interests at stake in the use of money in
a political campaign. The Supreme Court has readily extended full
First Amendment protection to activity that is neither conceptually
nor practically definable, in and of itself, as an act of expression. The
most obvious examples that come to mind are the right of political
association and the freedom of thought. 6 Under appropriate cir-
cumstances, the right to spend or give money quite clearly qualifies as
just such an ancillary right. To focus exclusively on one segmented
element of the broader communicative process, as the property rights
perspective does, ignores the extent to which that one element is in-
herently intertwined with the fruits of that process.
Once one acknowledges the fatal flaws in the total property rights
perspective, the logic of the partial property rights perspective be-
comes similarly suspect. The partial perspective, as previously noted,
acknowledges that the use of money in political campaigns includes
certain fully protected expressive elements, but posits that the pres-
ence of significant non-expressive elements dilutes or modifies the
level of First Amendment protection given to such behavior." As a
result, government may regulate such behavior without satisfying the
compelling interest standard normally employed when it encroaches
on First Amendment rights.
It is true that the Supreme Court has held that when expression is
intertwined with non-expressive elements, "a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can jus-
tify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.""8 But this
reasoning does not control when the non-expressive activity is itself
an essential catalyst to the meaningful exercise of a would-be
speaker's expressive activity. Just as the First Amendment would nec-
essarily extend full protection to the non-speech financial activities in
the analogous examples previously discussed, because without them
the expression itself could not come to fruition, restriction on the use
76 I have discussed the concept of ancillary First Amendment rights in earlier work. Martin
H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement and First
Amendment Theory, CR!M.JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 29, 34-35.
77 See, e.g.,J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE LJ. 1001,
1005-06 (1976) (arguing that political spending and giving are a form of conduct related to
speech, rather than pure speech, and therefore laws regulating these activities should be subject
to a lesser standard of judicial review).
78 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting First Amendment challenge
to federal law making it a crime to destroy a draft card).
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of money in a political campaign will inevitably reduce the candi-
date's ability to communicate with the electorate. Both the full prop-
erty rights perspective and the partial conduct view, then, danger-
ously place form over substance. By taking so myopic a view of the
expressive process, both views enable government to interfere signifi-
cantly with fully protected expressive activities.
The unfortunate and puzzling irony of all this is that the category
of expression that is disrupted as a result of either of these ap-
proaches is core political speech. Scholars who believe that First
Amendment protection extends exclusively or predominantly to such
expression reason that free speech facilitates operation of the elec-
toral process, by providing the voter with information and opinion
relevant to the voting decision." It has long been my belief that such
a rationale unduly truncates the values served by the First Amend-
ment guarantee. 0 But even the narrowest of First Amendment schol-
ars recognize the importance of political expression."' Yet by exclud-
ing the use of money in political campaigns from the scope of the
First Amendment, scholars and jurists effectively undermine this core
value served by the free speech guarantee. The simple reality is that
today money is essential to communicate a candidate's message to the
electorate. Indeed, one of the primary rationales for seeking to limit
the role of economic power in political campaigns is presumably the
desire to reduce the supposed communicative advantage that is said
to flow from that economic superiority. ' Those who seek to justify
the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation cannot in the
same breath deny First Amendment protection on the grounds that
communication is not involved in the use of money.
Postulate 2: To the Extent the Use of Money is Properly Characterized as Pro-
tected Expression, Campaign Contributions Represent
Only a Marginal Form of Expressive Activity
Even advocates of campaign finance reform who concede that ex-
pression is implicated at all in the use of money, assert that contribu-
tions to political campaigns represent at best only a marginal form of
expression. For this reason, the argument proceeds, limitations on
contributions may be more easily justified than limitations on direct
expenditures. The argument is premised on the view that contribu-
tions are simply not speech; they do not communicate to a third party
the contributor's views. They are, rather, fundamentally a form of
" Eg., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
E.g, Martin H. Redish & KirkJ. Kaludis, 77w Rigi ofExkeasitrAees in FmtA-nzdrrent Tht-
oy: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dikinma 93 Nw. U. L REv. 1083 (1999).
See Robert H. Bork, Neutra Principles and Some First Azendmtnt Ptrclfnar 47 IND. LJ. 1. 20
(1971) ("Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly politi-
cal.").
See discussion infra Part II, Postulate 5.
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non-expressive conduct.
This was largely the position taken by the Court in Buckley."3
There the Court reasoned that while contributions do represent an
exercise of a form of associational rights protected under the First
Amendment, that associational interest is fully vindicated when a con-
tribution of any amount is permitted.84 The size of the contribution,
the Court believed, was irrelevant to the nature of protected expres-
sive activity involved.85 It was on this basis that the Court distin-
guished restrictions on contributions from restrictions on expendi-
tures.86
For this reason, the highly restrictive federal limitations on con-
tributions do not interfere with protected rights of expression: The
contribution of $1000 constitutes as much an exercise of associational
rights as would the contribution of $50,000. Because the federal limi-
tations on contributions did not substantially interfere with full pro-
tected expression, government could justify such limitations on the
basis of a considerably lesser showing than the First Amendment
would require when pure expression is restricted. 87
Such reasoning places form over substance, and in so doing ig-
nores the vitally important role that campaign contributions play in
furthering both the democratic process and the system of free ex-
pression. The conclusion that contributions are at best a marginal
form of protected speech ignores two vital ways in which contribu-
tions fit within the framework of free speech. First, the very act of
contributing constitutes a form of fully protected expression (what
can be called "first party" expressive activity). Second, contributions
facilitate the ability of the candidate to communicate her message,
and in this sense represent a facilitation of the candidate's expression
(what can be called "third party" expressive activity).
That contributions are themselves a form of pure expressive activ-
ity can be seen by analogizing them to voluntary campaign activity.
83 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976).
84 Id.
85 As the Buckle), Court noted, a contribution limit:
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free com-
munication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate
and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The
quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size
of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act
of contributing.
Id. at 20-21. The Court acknowledged that "the size of the contribution provides a very rough
index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate." Id. at 21. However, this
apparently did not convince the Court that restrictions on the size of the contribution could
affect First Amendment rights in a meaningful way.
86 The Court reasoned that while an expenditure limit "precludes most associations from
effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents," contribution limits "leave the contributor
free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's
efforts on behalf of candidates." Id. at 22.
87 Id.
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Those who volunteer for a candidate are exercising fully protected
rights of expression, whether they deal directly with the electorate or
aid indirectly through such activities as office work. By undertaking
such activity, the individual demonstrates her political allegiance and
thereby communicates a message concerning her beliefs. Moreover,
she simultaneously exercises her First Amendment right to associate
herself with a particular political position. However, today, according
to one authority, "[c]andidates and parties... no longer use the par-
ticipatory activity they once did .... Generally the decline in volun-
teered activity followed the decline in the parties' role in cam-
paigns... ."s Thus, today "the defense of checkbook participation
comes down to an assertion that the standards and avenues of citizen
obligation change over time and that the giving of cash is a quintes-
sential political activity for our era.' '
Once the First Amendment nature of the act of political contribu-
tion is recognized, the Buckley Court's conclusion, that whatever First
Amendment rights are in fact implicated by the act of political con-
tributions are vindicated by the making of a contribution of any size,
can be seen to be fallacious. The conclusion is no more valid than
would be the view that the First Amendment rights implicated by po-
litical activity in support of a candidate are fully satisfied, regardless
of how much or how little time the individual is allowed to devote to
that activity. A $50,000 contribution can have a dramatically more
significant impact on a candidate's campaign than a contribution of
$1000-a fact the contributor obviously knows when the contribution
is made. The intensity of the commitment can be seen to be re-
flected in the amount of the contribution.
Even if one rejects this "first party" perspective on campaign con-
tributions, the facilitative role which contributions obviously serve
should not be ignored. Candidate communication costs money; to
the extent that the candidate lacks the ability to pay, his ability to
communicate is naturally reduced. Indeed, the Buchlde Court recog-
nized as much when it invalidated limitations on candidate expendi-
tures.' But if the candidate lacks her own funding, obtaining signifi-
cant amounts in contributions naturally enables the candidate to
communicate in ways that would be impossible otherwise. It does not
require high level mathematical analysis, then, to recognize that sig-
nificant limits on the amount of contributions iuill inversely reduce
the candidate's ability to communicate her message. The result will
be a decrease in voter awareness of the candidate's records and opin-
ion. In this sense, then, campaign contributions play a vitally impor-
tant role as a catalyst in fostering political communication among the
electorate.
& SORAUF, supra note 56, at 38.
89Id
Buck/ey, 424 U.S. at 23.
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It does not necessarily follow from this analysis that limits on cam-
paign contributions should be held unconstitutional." Conceivably,
one could recognize campaign contributions as fully protected ex-
pression, but nevertheless conclude that the social and political justi-
fications for such limitations constitute sufficiently compelling inter-
ests to validate what are prima facie violations of free speech. It does
follow, however, that if this conclusion is to be reached, it cannot be
on the basis of only a minimal level of judicial scrutiny of those justi-
fications because the First Amendment is only marginally implicated.
Postulate 3: In Reviewing the Constitutionality of Campaign
Finance Regulation, The Judiciary Should Give Significant
Deference to Legislative Judgments
If, in reviewing the constitutionality of campaign finance regula-
tion, one were to adopt either the exclusive property rights approach
or the partial conduct analysis, substantial deference to legislative
discretion would flow inexorably. Under the exclusive property
rights model, courts would employ the highly deferential "rational
basis" standard of review, which almost certainly would be satisfied.
Under the partial conduct analysis, an intermediate standard of re-
view would be employed . In neither case would a reviewing court
employ the strict scrutiny of a compelling interest standard normally
employed when legislation encroaches on rights of free expression.
Similarly, if one were to conclude that only contributions lack the
qualities of fully protected expression, presumably one would signifi-
candy reduce the scope and intensity of judicial review for only con-
tribution restrictions.
There are some who believe that broad deference to legislative
judgments is especially appropriate in the context of campaign fi-
nance regulation, even if one assumes that fully protected expression
is involved. The argument presumes that laws regulating campaign
finance simultaneously further certain individuals' constitutional
rights while diminishing the rights of others. As Justice Breyer rea-
soned in his concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC:
[Bly limiting the size of the largest contributions, [legislative] restrictions
aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear
upon the electoral process. In doing so, they seek to build public confi-
dence in that process and broaden the base of a candidate's meaningful
financial support, encouraging the public participation and open discus-
'U Ultimately, however, I do conclude that such limitations are, in fact, unconstitutional. See
discussion infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
92 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (noting that, "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms").
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sion that the First Amendment itself presupposes."
When competing constitutional interests are implicated by legisla-
tion, Justice Breyer argued, "a presumption against constitutionality is
out of place .... In such circumstances... the Court has closely scru-
tinized the statute's impact on those interests, but refrained from
employing a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality.
Rather, it has balanced interests.""
On its face, Justice Breyer's argument does not appear to call for
substantial deference to the legislative choice. Rather, he purports
merely to favor a neutral "balanc[ing of] interests" over "a presump-
ion against constitutionality."9 But Justice Breyer's words must be
read against the history and reality of the Supreme Court's First
Amendmentjurisprudence. At no point has the Court ever adopted
"a presumption" of unconstitutionality. Instead, at most it has placed
a heavy burden on government to justify its regulation.' On the
other hand, when the Court has employed the language of "interest
balancing," it has usually employed these words as a euphemism for
all-but-total deference to legislative choices.!'
ThatJustice Breyer was in fact urging the equivalent of substantial
deference to legislative judgments is further evidenced by his subse-
quent analysis of relative expertise. "W here a legislature has signifi-
cantly greater institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of
election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legisla-
tive judgments-at least where that deference does not risk such con-
stitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves
from effective electoral challenge."" Breyer expressed the view "that
the legislature understands the problem-the threat to electoral in-
tegrity, the need for democratization-better than do we. We should
defer to its political judgment that unlimited spending threatens the
integrity of the electoral process.""
It is true that he immediately qualified this statement by noting
that the Court "should not defer in respect to whether its solution, by
imposing too low a contribution limit, significantly increases the
reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and
thereby insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge."' co But
he summarily rejected this concern, without any apparent meaning-
ful investigation of the question. Instead, he generously accepted the
harms that might flow from such regulations: "any contribution stat-
q3 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S. Ct. 897, 911 (2000) (BreyerJ., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted).
9 Id. at 912.
95ld
Id.
9 E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126-34 (1959).
_qNixon, 120 S. Ct. at 912 (Breyerj., concurring).
99 . at 913.
101 Id.
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ute... will narrow the field of conceivable challengers to some de-
gree. Undue insulation is a practical matter, and it cannot be in-
ferred automatically from the fact that the limit makes ballot access
more difficult for one previously unsuccessful candidate."'0 ' But if a
clear case of challenger ballot exclusion does not meet Justice
Breyer's criterion for showing electoral insulation, then what evi-
dence would satisfy it? In effect, Justice Breyer is concluding that
deference should be imposed in all cases of campaign finance regula-
tion. Respected commentators have similarly urged deference to leg-
islative choices in this area, on two related grounds: the presence of





These arguments, made generally by those normally considered
protective of free speech, are so patently misguided that one can only
wonder whether a result orientation in favor of controlling economic
power in political campaigns is driving the analysis. In pointing out
the serious flaws in the arguments in support of deference, one must
distinguish between the two prongs of the reasoning: (1) that the
presence of competing constitutionally protected interests in the area
of campaign finance regulation effectively creates a constitutional
stalemate, thereby justifying deference; and (2) that the legislature's
unique expertise on issues of the electoral process also dictates defer-
ence. Analysis of each argument clearly demonstrates its fatal inaccu-
racies.
Initially, the argument premised on the assumption that laws
regulating campaign finance simultaneously expand the First
Amendment rights of some while undermining the rights of others is
highly dubious on two distinct levels of analysis. One may seriously
question whether these laws in any way expand the constitutional
rights of anyone, for reasons to be explored in detail in subsequent
discussion.' Of course, if the very premise of the argument is em-
pirically inaccurate, then the argument itself falls. But more impor-
tantly, even if one proceeds on an assumption of the premise's accu-
racy, it in no way follows that judicial deference is dictated. Indeed,
when competing constitutional interests are affected by legislative ac-
tion, the need for the institutional independence and interpretive
expertise of the judiciary becomes even more important. A law that
simultaneously impacts conflicting constitutional provisions calls for
careful, dispassionate, and experienced judicial analysis to insure that
101 Id. (citation omitted)
102 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1135 (2d ed. 1988) ("If the
net effect of the legislation is to [enhance freedom of speech,] then the exacting review re-
served for abridgements of free speech may be inapposite."); BeVier, supra note 6, at 1048 (not-
ing that commentators have on occasion urged deference on the basis of "Congress' superior
institutional capacity with regard to the governmental interests that the limitations are alleged
to serve.").
10s See discussion infta Part II, Postulate 5.
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the balance struck by the legislative branch does not inordinately
skew one of the constitutional interests involved.
Supreme Court precedent has not evinced the slightest indication
that extraordinary judicial deference is called for when conflicting
constitutional interests are implicated. For example, in cases pitting
the First Amendment right of free press against the constitutional
right of fair trial, the Court has painstakingly analyzed the competing
interests and drawn its independent constitutional conclusions. '
Similarly, when the First Amendment right of free expression has
come into conflict with the quasi-constitutional interest in individual
privacy, the Court has in no way shunned its ultimate responsibility to
draw a constitutional balance." Thus, the holding of Marbin " v.
Madison" still stands, especially when decision calls for a careful
structural analysis of different constitutional provisions or interests.
Equally unpersuasive is the argument that the presence of a spe-
cial legislative expertise concerning the electoral process dictates def-
erence to legislative choices in the area. At the outset, it is important
to note that past instances of almost blind judicial deference to sup-
posed legislative expertise have proven disastrous to the interests of
liberty, as the Japanese exclusion cases 0' and the free speech cases of
the so-called McCarthy era0" have proven all too clearly. In both of
these instances, the Court deferred to the supposedly superior exper-
tise of government officials, which most scholars would today recog-
nize to have been severe miscarriages of justice that seriously under-
mined fundamental constitutional liberties.
Judicial deference to legislative judgments when First Amendment
rights are at stake undermines the judiciary's central role as a coun-
ter-majoritarian check on the majoritarian branches of government.
It would, in ChiefJustice Marshall's famous words in Marby, provide
to the legislative branch "a practical and real omnipotence" that is
wholly inconsistent with the very nature of a counter-majoritarian,
written constitution.
The most important response to all of the arguments for defer-
ence to legislative judgment in the area of campaign finance regula-
tion, however, is that appropriate skepticism of legislative motivation
renders this subject the very last place where judicial deference is dic-
104 See, eg., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319. 1324-26 (1975) (noting a potential con-
flict between the First Amendment and the right to a fair trial).
105 See, ag., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 476-97 (1975) (detailing Supreme Court
precedent balancing First Amendment rights with the right to privacy); Tme. Inc. v. Hill. 385
U.S. 374, 380-98 (1967) (discussing the balancing between freedom of expression and protec-
tion of privacy).
106 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the power ofjudicial review).
107 E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
109 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
I have discussed the theory of the counter-majoritarian principle in detail. .LRTIN H.
REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLrICAL ORDER 75-136 (1991).11 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
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tated. Indeed, regulation of campaign finance is among the very last
areas in which such deference should be invoked, for the simple rea-
son that the legislator's retention in office will inevitably be affected
by, if not determined by, the nature of restrictions on the financing
of their own and their opponents' campaigns.
That legislators' decisions are often influenced by factors other
than a neutral assessment of the public interest is surely not a new in-
sight. For many years, public choice theorists have pointed to "the
problems produced by the existence of interest groups ... and their
influence over the political process.""' They have asserted that the
legislative process "allows powerful private organizations to block
necessary government action,"". and that as a result "the lawmaking
process has been transformed into a series of accommodations
among competing elites.""3 Public choice theory portrays politicians
as "wealth-maximizing egoists," 4 who, when sitting in legislatures,
"will produce too few laws that serve truly public ends, and too many
laws that serve private ends."
' 5
Public choice theory, in short, posits that legislation is often the
product not of legislators' neutral assessment of the public interest
but rather of narrow self-interest, either of the legislators themselves,
their constituents, powerful private interests, or all three. While I
have serious doubts that the reality is nearly as simplistic as the public
choice theory posits,"6 surely it would be naive to assume an unwaver-
ing purity of legislative motivation." 7 As the theory of "legislative en-
trenchment" suggests, the problem is aggravated when the legislator's
own continuation in office is at stake." 8
The most obvious self-interested motivation for the imposition of
restrictions on campaign expenditures or contributions is preserva-
tion of the advantages of incumbency. An incumbent possesses sig-
nificant strategic advantages over a lesser known challenger, due to
II Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 29 (1985).
1:2 Id. (footnote omitted).
1"3 Id
114 Abner Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988) (critiquing public choice theory).H William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 277 (1988). On the subject of public choice theory,
see generally Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 554 (1991).'ii REDISH, supra note 109, at 9-10.
1 7 See Marshall, supra note 61, at 341:
Nowhere ... do the insights of public choice hold more resonance than in the area of
campaign regulation. Unlike other legislative actions-which may or may not benefit in-
cumbents depending on whether they appeal to voters--campaign reform is a direct
regulation of the reelection process. Obviously, no self-interested maximizer is going to
support legislation that makes her reelection more difficult.
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 CEO. L.J.
491, 498 (1997) (- [T]he desire of representatives to perpetuate their hold on office may induce
them to act contrary to the preferences of their constituents on a variety of issues; we might call
this the 'agency' problem of representative government or 'legislative entrenchment.'").
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past exposure, a built-in platform for drawing media attention, and,
at least at the federal level, a franking privilege that enables the in-
cumbent to communicate with his constituents at government ex-
pense. The best way for a challenger to counterbalance those com-
petitive disadvantages is through the use of money to communicate
his qualifications and message. In fact, the 1971 Federal Election
Campaign Act was jokingly referred to in the halls of Congress as the
"Incumbents' Preservation Act.""9 The 1974 Act, not surprisingly, ex-
cluded the congressional franking privilege from its reach, "thereby
preserving one of the incumbents' most powerful reelection tools."49
To be sure, some argue that today incumbency is actually fur-
thered by unlimited campaign spending and contributions, since in-
cumbents usually attract contributions at a much faster rate than do
their challengers."' But to the extent such a motivating force is at
work, presumably no spending or contribution limits would be en-
acted in the first place. The only point at which the First Amend-
ment comes into play, of course, is after legislative restrictions have
been adopted. To the extent Congress or state legislatures do, in
fact, enact such restrictions, the theories of legislative entrenchment
and public choice would seem to suggest that the individual legisla-
tors have concluded that they are personally helped more by the im-
position of such limits than by their absence.
It surely does not follow either that campaign finance legislation
should be assumed to be universally motivated by improper motives,
or that for these reasons such legislation should automatically be
deemed unconstitutional. The point, however, is that the very real
possibility that campaign finance legislation is motivated by question-
able considerations renders absolute folly the idea that in reviewing
First Amendment challenges to such legislation the judiciary should
defer to the supposed legislative superiority in expertise.
It is true thatJustice Breyer in Nixon recognized at least the theo-
retical possibility of such improper legislative motivation, and sug-
gested that proof of such motivation should dictate more searching
judicial scrutiny22 But as already noted, Justice Breyer failed to make
clear how such proof could ever be established. Nor did he deal with
the potentially serious friction that might occur, from either separa-
tion-of-powers or federalism perspectives, to which such a judicial in-
19 See ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION 154-55
(1983) (discussing the Act).
120 Marshall, supra note 61, at 339; see also Marlene Arnold Nicholson. Campaign Finanamgand
EqualPromection, 26 STAN. L REv. 815, 847 (1974) (discussing the difficulties facing of challeng-
ers, third parties, and independents).
1 Eg., GOmEL ET AL, supra note 20, at 41-44; Marshall, supra note 61, at 69-70.
122 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. GoVt PAC, 120 S. Ct. 910, 912.-13 (2000) (Breyer.J.. concumng). me
discussion supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text (proiding analsis of the strengths and
weaknesses ofJustice Breyer's position).
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quiry into subjective legislative motivation could give rise.' 23 In any
event, none of the other jurists or scholars who have urged that
courts provide such deference appear to have even acknowledged the
possibility of such concerns.
As subsequent discussion will demonstrate, the level of judicial
scrutiny may well be outcome determinative in resolving the constitu-
tional issues surrounding campaign finance regulation, because most
of the arguments that have been amassed to establish the need for
such legislation constitute largely conclusory and empirically unsup-
ported assertions.2 4  To the extent a reviewing court employs the
highly deferential "rational basis" standard of judicial review, such
laws would almost surely be upheld on the basis of what amounts to
little more than a fig leaf of justification. Were a reviewing court to
demand that the government justify blatant incursions into the rights
of free expression, however, it is highly doubtful that the feeble em-
pirical evidence that exists would suffice to support a finding of con-
stitutionality.
Many respected commentators have urged the need for broad
deference to legislative choice in the area of campaign finance regu-
lation. But the legal system has learned the hard way through past
experience that blind deference to legislative choices when free
speech rights are at stake is likely to lead to constitutional disaster.
This is for the simple reason that in regulating expression govern-
ment officials are too likely to be influenced by considerations of per-
sonal prejudice, self-interest, or public pressure. In resolving the pre-
liminary issue of the level of judicial review, we should never forget
these sad but important lessons from recent constitutional history.
Postulate 4: The Underlying Theoretical Rationale for Extending
First Amendment Protection to the Use of Money in Political Campaigns
is Improperly Grounded in a Narrowly Based Individualism
Even if one were to concede both that the use of money in politi-
cal campaigns is properly classified as purely expressive activity and
that no basis exists for special judicial deference, one may neverthe-
less reject the extension of full First Amendment protection to cam-
paign contributions or expenditures. Such an argument is premised
on the view that the argument for First Amendment protection is
grounded in a misguidedly narrow perspective on the values fostered
by the free expression guarantee. For example, defenders of cam-
paign expenditure limitations have asserted that the Buckley Court
123 I have discussed the possibility of such friction in prior work. MARTIN H. REDISH,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICALANALYSIS 124-25 (1984).
124 See discussion infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text (stating that there has never been
an adequate showing that corrupt quid pro quo arrangements present a serious problem to so-
ciety).
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"was incorrect in viewing freedom of expression as a negative right of
the individual against the State. Rather, free speech should be un-
derstood in relation to its goal of furthering an informed electorate
and promoting political participation."' 2' As Professor Kathleen Sulli-
van has written, "[a]rguments for greater limits on political contribu-
tions and expenditures typically suggest that any claims for individual
liberty to spend political money ought yield to an overriding interest
in a well-functioning democracy."126
Professor Burt Neuborne is the leading advocate of this position.
In his view, the Supreme Court in Buceh, improperly "treated unlim-
ited campaign spending as privileged autonomous behavior,"' - and
while he believed it "possible to limit the spending of the super-rich
within the confines of an autonomy-centered First Amendment,"'- he
recognized that "those confines are becoming increasingly difficult to
maintain. "'2 He has questioned whether the autonomy vision of the
First Amendment actually represents a coherent theoretical view. He
has suggested, however, that "[a]s it becomes increasingly difficult in
an election context to maintain a coherent vision of a First Amend-
ment that is exclusively designed to preserve autonomy, the question
arises whether other possible visions exist that might supplant, or at
least supplement, the traditional autonomy model."', Professor
Neuborne asserts that the supplemental model should view free ex-
pression as playing "a democracy-enabling role" which posits that the
First Amendment should be viewed as "democracy's safety net."""
Viewing the First Amendment "as a bulwark of democracy (as well as
a protection of individual autonomy), the First Amendment tells us
that, when more than one candidate for First Amendment autonomy
protection exists in a democracy case, the Court should privilege be-
havior that benefits democracy rather than behavior that saps its vital-
ity."132 While Professor Neuborne briefly acknowledges the possibility
that "powerful arguments exist in favor of unlimited campaign spend-
ing," he notes that "[t] here are equally powerful arguments-rooted
in democratic theory and our commitment to political equality-in
favor of content-neutral, narrowly tailored restrictions on massive
campaign spending by wealthy individuals."'"
12 Marshall, supr note 61, at 350. Professor Marshall, it should be noted, %%s not necessarily
endorsing this position, but rather merely summarizing one established line of scholarly
thought. Id at 349-50. For an expression of a iew similar to this, see alsojamin Raskin &John
Bonifaz, Equa Protection and the Wea!th Primay I1YALEL & POL'Y REv. 273, 320-324 (1993).
126 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 671.
1 Neuborne, supra note 4, at 1062.
128 Id
19Id.
128 Id. at 1068.
131 6
is- Id. at 1070.
1ss Id. at 1070-71.
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It is certainly true that for a number of years free speech theorists
have debated competing individualist and communitarian models of
free expression.'34 Some have suggested that the underlying norma-
tive rationale of First Amendment protection is a belief in the value
of individual autonomy and development. Others have argued that it
is the facilitation of democratic society, rather than the narrow and
selfish concerns of the individual, that provides the moral core of free
speech protection. One may reasonably question, however, the ex-
tent to which there is really an argument between the two normative
models. Both theories proceed on an assumption of the value of self-
determination, though one focuses on the self-determination of the
individual while the other focuses on the self-determination of the
society itself. But it should be recalled that a democratic society is ul-
timately composed of its individual members, and that if those indi-
vidual members do not function as free thinking entities worthy of
respect, the society as a whole will likely flounder. 5' Once that sym-
biotic intersection between individual and democratic society is rec-
ognized, the number of instances in which a free speech conflict ex-
ists between the two models will be relatively rare.
The primary fallacy in the critique from free speech theory, how-
ever, is that the strongest First Amendment arguments against cam-
paign finance limitations are grounded in a systemic view, rather than
an individualist view of the First Amendment. Thus, Professor Neub-
orne's initial premise-that the First Amendment attack against cam-
paign finance regulation is grounded in an individualist model of
free speech theory-is fundamentally flawed at the outset.
What renders campaign spending and contribution limitations so
damaging to fundamental free speech values is the simple fact that
money is necessary to communicate, and a restriction on the avail-
ability or use of money in a campaign will therefore inevitably reduce
the scope and amount of communication disseminated to the vot-
ers. 136 Indeed, as already noted, it is the supposed communicative ad-
vantage gained from financial superiority that fuels the campaign fi-
nance reform movement. This result severely undermines free
speech interests, not primarily because it interferes with an individ-
ual's autonomous decision to speak, but rather because it promotes
voter ignorance. Because candidate A has available substantial funds,
he is able to communicate his message effectively to the electorate.
1 Compare C. EDWIN BAKER, HUmN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-69 (1989) (advo-
cating individual liberty as rationale for free speech), with MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 79 (ground-
in sree speech exclusively in democratic process values).
See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1503-06 (1988) (discussing Repub-
lican constitutionalism and need for individual liberties).
1 See Smith, supra note 6, at 1060 ("Increased campaign spending translates into a better-
informed electorate."); see also GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 31
(1980) (noting that empirical studies have demonstrated that "the extent and content of in-
formation [voters] ... have has a decisive effect on how they vote").
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Because candidate B lacks such funding, she is unable effectively to
communicate her message. The goal of expenditure limitations and,
at least indirectly, contribution limitations, is to reduce Candidate A's
ability to communicate to a level roughly comparable to the lower
capabilities of Candidate B. But the inescapable result-indeed, the
very goal-of campaign finance limitations is create an equality in
voter ignorance: The voters will now be just as ignorant about Can-
didate A as they would have been in any event about Candidate B.
This result is completely inconsistent writh the democratic process
goal of free speech protection. Alexander Meiklejohn, the leading
democratic process free speech theorist, reasoned that the principle
of free speech "springs from the necessities of the program of self-
government." 's ' Society's initial commitment to democracy logically
dictates the guarantee of free expression because voters need a broad
and uninhibited range of communication of information and opin-
ion relevant to their "self-governing" decisions in the voting booth.""A
The inescapable and intended impact of campaign financing limita-
tion is that voters will have less information and opinions than they
would have had available to them othenise.
Meiklejohn's theory, it should be emphasized, did not turn not on
the recognition of an individual autonomy value." ' His concern,
rather, was exclusively on the symbiotic relationship between free ex-
pression and the democratic process." Yet limits on a candidate's
ability to raise or spend money inevitably undermine the core of the
process values that Meiklejohn articulated. Thus, it is the systemic
value of democratic facilitation, rather than a narrow autonomy-
based value, that lies at the heart of the First Amendment challenge
to restrictions on campaign expenditures or fund raising."' It is not
surprising, then, that one of the leading scholarly advocates of the
unconstitutionality of most forms of campaign finance regulation si-
multaneously rejects an individualist model of free speech theory."
, MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 79, at 27.
MO I& at 16-17.
S The First Amendment, Meiklejohn argued, is not concerned about an indihidual's prwiate
right to speak. Id at 52-54.
140 Id. at 78-89.
141 This is not to suggest that Meiklejohn himself would necessarily have iewed campaign
finance regulation as a violation of the First Amendment. But to the extent he would have
found such laws constitutional, it would have resulted from his own fallacy-what I have in ear-
lier discussions referred to as the fallacy of the New England town meeting. Martin H. Redish &
Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Citic Republican Retival m Consttuuonal Theory: The
Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267, 291-92 (1991). See grnr/ll. MEIKLEJOILN, supra note
79, at 8-28. In that earlier discussion, I argue that Meiklejohn improperly analogized societ to
a self-contained New England town meeting, where we can operate with the assurance that all
those present have been exposed to speaker communications. This is not an assumption we
can reasonably make in general society. The point emphasized in text is simply that the proc-
ess-based values recognized by Meiklejohn are threatened by restrictions on candidates' abilities
to communicate their message to the voters. Id
14 See BeVier, supra note 6, at 1053-54 (Giving money to political campaigns. after all. long
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Postulate 5: Expenditure and Contribution Limits are Necessary in Order to
Remove Inequities Among Economically Disparate Groups and Individuals,
in Furtherance of the First Amendment Interest in Equality
Though the Supreme Court has uniformly rejected the argu-
ment, 43 perhaps the most widely used rationale to support the consti-
tutionality of campaign finance limitations is the theory that such re-
strictions are necessary to assure political equality among
economically disparate groups and individuals. The argument is, ba-
sically, "that the Court has simply ignored the reality that wealth has
tremendous power and influence over the political process and that
this power distorts political choice."
4
There exist two ways in which the equality argument can be ra-
tionalized. First, one could view the argument as a subset of equal
protection, on a moral if not a constitutional level. Economic dis-
parities are unfair, the theory assumes, because they result in an in-
equitable disparity in the ability to exercise fundamental expressive
rights. In a certain sense, the argument is little more than a specific
application of a broader normative theory of economic redistribu-
tion, viewed through a lens of equal protection. In another sense,
however, the equality rationale may be viewed predominantly
through a free speech lens, as a means of bringing about equality
among speakers. This approach draws on the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of an equal protection subset of free speech theory and doc-
trine.
146
The equality rationale arguably gains unique strength when ap-
plied to so fundamental a right as the right of free expression. Pursu-
ing this fundamental rights perspective, scholars have sought to
analogize campaign finance restrictions 147 to the Supreme Court's
[has] been a customary and peaceful was of expressing political preferences .... The Court
must carefully police legislative attempts to limit such activities because the activities themselves
are constitutionally valuable.").
143 In Buckley, the Court expressly rejected the equality rationale as a constitutionally accept-
able justification for expenditure limitations: "The Constitution does not require the govern-
ment to 'finance the efforts of every nascent political group' merely because Congress chose to
finance the efforts of the major parties." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 98 (1976) (citations omit-
ted).
144 Marshall, supra note 61, at 349 (footnote omitted).
145 This theory is considered in detail in Martin H. Redish & KirkJ. Kaludis, The Right of Ex-pressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW.
U. L. REV. 1083 (1999).
146 See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Equality
as a Central Principle in the First Amendmeni 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
147 Note that the political equality argument, if accepted, simultaneously justifies both ex-
penditure and contribution limitations. To the extent one were to reject the equality argument
and instead focus exclusively on the avoidance-of-corruption rationale (as the Supreme Court
did in Buckley), it is likely that only restrictions on contributions would be justified, though
there exists debate on the point. See discussion infra Part II, Postulate 6.
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holding, grounded in equal protection, that legislative districts must
be based on a principle of "one-person, one-vote.""' Just as one voter
may not distort his political influence by having more votes than
other voters, so too, should those with economic power not be per-
mitted to exert relatively greater influence over the political proc-
149ess.
The voting analogy, however, is misguided. It unadvisedly seeks to
equate a formalized, single act with a process that is clearly intended
to be "uninhibited, robust, and wide open."' A logical extrapolation
of the analogy would presumably require each speaker to speak for
the exact same period of time, for anything more or less would of
course destroy the equality that voting is constitutionally required to
achieve. Such a result, however, would no doubt destroy the flow and
spontaneity that is a central part of the expressive system.
Moreover, if one really wanted to impose a rigid, formalized
equality analogous to the voting structure, presumably one couldn't
limit oneself to economic differences. Some speakers are louder or
more articulate than others, and the result of allowing such dispari-
ties to continue would be that some speakers have more power and
influence than others. Since such a result is naturally unconstitu-
tional in the voting context, and if we proceed on an assumption of a
rigid analogy to the voting model, then such disparities can properly
be removed.
Such results would obviously be nonsensical, a fact that under-
scores the absurdity of the voting analogy in the first place. Though
speech and voting are intertwined both practically and conceptually,
they are very different acts with very different roles and requirements.
A vote is an act with direct legal, non-expressive consequences. The
act of voting is qualitatively different from attempting to convince
someone how to vote, just as advocating violent overthrow is different
from actually attempting overthrow.
Those who make the analogy might respond, however, that it is
just that-an analogy, not an identity. The point, they could assert, is
not that the two processes are rigidly identical, but merely that they
reflect roughly similar concerns and values. But the differences be-
tween the two are much more fundamental. By its nature, the "one-
person, one-vote" rule represents a rigid, mathematically based equal-
148 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). SeeSullivan, supra note 14. at 671 (-(The equality]
argument starts from the principle of formal equality of suffrage embodied in the one person,
one vote rule that emerged from the reapportionment cases."); Marshall, supra note 61, at 349
("[Tihe equal protection principle of one-person, one-vote supports the regulation of cam-
paign finance in service of equality interests."); Sunstein, supra note 5. at 1392 ("The 'one per-
son-one vote' rule exemplifies the commitment to political equality. Limits on campaign ex-
penditures are continuous with that rule.*).
149 See David A. Strauss, Cormption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform.94 COLL M. L REv.
1369, 1382-85 (1994).
ISO New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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ity about an act that gives rise to legally enforceable, non-expressive
consequences. Hence, the analogy is reminiscent of the Holy Roman
Empire, which, as we now know, was neither holy, Roman, nor an
empire. Similarly, equality in political campaigning is just like equal-
ity in voting, except we do not mean "equal" in the same sense, nor
do we refer to voting.
In any event, the voting analogy fails, for the simple reason that in
the voting context state action has affirmatively given rise to the in-
equity, while in the expressive context no direct, affirmative govern-
mental actions have caused the disparity in expressive power. More
importantly, to focus exclusively on the equality aspect of the "one
person, one vote rule"-as do those who make the analogy to cam-
paign finance-is to ignore the importance of the underlying af-
firmative right. If equality were the sole concern, one could of course
satisfy that interest by prohibiting anyone from voting in the first
place. There can be little doubt that the independently protected
constitutional right to vote would not be satisfied by governmental
creation of such an equality of electoral impotence. Yet those who
urge limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures appear
to be satisfied by-indeed, to be motivated by-the creation of an
equality of voter ignorance, surely not a result consistent with the
goals of free expression, whether viewed on systemic or individualist
levels. It must always be kept in mind that by limiting the ability of
those with economic power to spend or contribute for purposes of
political campaigns in no way expands the ability of those who lack
such power to communicate their political message.''
Additionally, it should be recalled that economic power often may
be used to offset other advantages that candidates may have, such as
notoriety in other fields. In fact, as already noted,52 the advantages of
incumbency can usually be overcome only by a challenger's use of
superior funds.'5 ' Thus, even if one were to accept the goal of equal-
ity in the abstract, it is by no means clear that imposing equality of
economic power would further distort other inequalities that affect
candidates.
Perhaps the most ominous aspect of the equality argument is its
likely-and arguably intended---disparate impact on political view-
151 To the extent the argument for equality is employed to justify governmentally dictated
access to existing communication sources, rather than governmentally imposed restrictions on
campaign contributions or expenditures, this concern over creation of an equality of ignorance
would not apply. However, such access rules give rise to their own serious constitutional diffi-
culties. Redish & Kaludis, supra note 145.
152 See discussion supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
153 See Marshall, supra note 61, at 339 ("Challengers generally need greater funds in order to
promote name recognition."); ANTHONY GIERZYNSKI, MONEY RULES: FINANCING ELECTIONS IN
AMERICA 30 (2000) (challenger spending yields a larger percentage of the vote, dollar for dol-
lar, than incumbent spending); id. at 60 (candidates challenging incumbents have heavy bur-
den to overcome through spending).
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point. For the most part, it is evident at the outset which side of the
political spectrum is most likely to possess economic power. the side
that wishes to maintain that economic superiority. Invariably, this ill
overwhelmingly include those on the conservative side of that spec-
trum. This is a fact surely known to all those who seek to impose re-
strictions on the use of money in political campaigns.'" One may
reasonably question, then, the extent to which such limits are view-
point neutral. In an ironic twist, therefore, it is conceivable that lim-
its imposed in the name of First Amendment equality actually un-
dernine the true equality principle of the First Amendment: the
equality of ideas.lss
Postulate 6: Contribution Limits Are Necessary to Deter Comption
and Maintain the Integrity of the Democratic Process
Though the point has long been disputed by campaign finance
reform advocates, since Buckle), the Supreme Court has steadfastly
maintained that the goal of achieving political equality cannot itself
justify restrictions on campaign finance."" Rather, the only accept-
able grounds for such regulation is the "prevention of corruption and
the appearance of corruption." 7 Because the Bucdey Court believed
that direct expenditures by a candidate did not present this threat, it
invalidated federal limits on expenditures.' However, the Court
found that limits on contributions did further that legitimate interest,
and therefore upheld limits on contributionsY59 The Court reasoned
in the following manner:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our
system of representative democracy is undermined .... Of almost equal
concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is te impact
154 For example, scholarly advocates of campaign finance limitations hawe complained that
"[i]n American society, there is a persistent... assumption that political power must serve bus-
ness interests." They have also recognized "the class inequalities nanifest in our current cam-
paign finance system." The goal of campaign finance regulation, these scholars assert. is -to
bring about a reign of true social and economic equality." jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz. The
Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiorit of Democralicaly Finanttd Edlzom' 94 COLUM. L
REV. 1160, 1203 (1994).
5 One might respond that absent governmentally imposed limits, inequality uill ncvrthe-
less prevail in favor of those ith conservative leanings. But to the extent this assertion is accu-
rate, it ignores the fact that those differences were not brought about by direct governmental
re§lation of expression, the way the inequalities resulting from the imposition of limits do.-6 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 98 (1976).
1 Id. at 25. See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 121 S. CL 296 (2000).
158 424 U.S. at 45.
159 Id. at 23-38. In a subsequent decision, the Court reiterated its position that 'preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling govern-
mental interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances." Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,496-97 (1985).
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of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large financial contribu-
tions .... [In enacting contribution limits] Congress could legitimately
conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence "is
also critical... if confidence of the system of representative government
is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent."16°
The Court recently reaffirmed its holding in Buckley that contribution
limits may be justified by the desire to avoid corruption in Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri PA C. 161
In critiquing this reasoning, it is at the outset necessary to under-
stand exactly what the Court means by the dangers of "corruption" or
the "appearance of corruption." As one commentator has correctly
noted, in Buckley, "the very concept of corruption was never clearly
defined."6 2 On one level, the term obviously extends to blatant acts
of bribery: the corrupt provision of an officially ordained benefit in
exchange for a quid pro quo. But while there can be little question
that avoidance of such acts is a matter of legitimate concern to gov-
ernment, there are serious problems with reliance on this concern as
ajustification for contribution limits.
Of course, if one were to begin-as the Buckley Court did-with
the assumption that contributions only marginally implicate free
speech interests, then presumably limits on contributions can be up-
held on the basis of a considerably lesser showing of need than could
a restriction on fully protected expressive activity."3 To the extent
this preliminary assumption explains the Court's approach to the re-
view of the avoidance-of-corruption justification, the lax scrutiny em-
ployed may be understandable. For reasons already discussed, how-
ever,' the view that contributions are not fully protected expression
is seriously flawed. Thus, my critique of the Court's scrutiny pro-
ceeds on the assumption that full First Amendment protection ex-
tends to political contributions. On the basis of that assumption, the
Court's reliance on the avoidance-of-corruption rationale-at least
when "corruption" is defined narrowly-is woefully inadequate to jus-
tify limits on contributions.
The inadequacy of the anti-corruption rationale derives from a
synthesis of four factors. First, it is by no means clear that corrupt
quid pro quo political arrangements currently present a real problem
facing the nation, or did at the time of the contribution limits' en-
actment. Second, to the extent such a problem exists, there is no ba-
10 424 U.S. at 26-27 (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
161 120 S. CL 897 (2000).
1 Sorauf, supra note 57, at 1350.
l Cf Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986)("We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justifica-
tion than restrictions on independent spending.").
K See discussion supra Part II, Postulates 1-2.
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sis on which to assume that all or even most contributions are made
on such a basis. Third, to the extent such a problem does exist, and
to the extent that in individual cases particular contributions have
been made on the basis of such a corrupt understanding, preexisting
bribery statutes or other possible less invasive legislative alternatives
adequately vindicate governmental interests. Fourth, even were we to
assume that contribution limits are necessary to deter the problem of
corrupt quid pro quo arrangements, it is difficult to believe that limits
as low as $1000 are required to avoid the harm. When taken to-
gether, these factors establish that contribution limits are significantly
over-broad in their efforts to solve a problem that has not been estab-
lished to exist.
Initially, there has never been an adequate empirical showing that
corrupt quid pro quo arrangements present a serious problem to so-
ciety. The Court in both Buckley and Nixon was willing to assume that
the political horrors of Watergate in 1972 justified such a concern."'
But as a perceptive commentator has correctly noted, "for all the be-
trayal of public trust set out in the Watergate papers, there were no
instances of quid pro quos for campaign contributions.""'  Even if
there had been, however, surely what happened in 1972 cannot
automatically be assumed to be true today. The Court in Nixon as-
serted that "Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large, corrupt
contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt
are neither novel nor implausible." 't But at no point has there ever
been a careful judicial examination of this conclusion in Bukl', nor
did the Court in Nixon make anything more than a cursor) inquiry
into the available empirical evidence about the current national situa-
tion, much less the specific situation in Missouri, whose statute was
subject to challenge in that case.''" Although the Nixon Court boldly
asserted that it had "never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to
carry a First Amendment burden,"'6' it is difficult to characterize the
Court's unsupported assumption that corrupt quid pro quo practices
are prevalent as anything but conjecture.
Even were one to assume that the problem of corrupt quid pro
quo arrangements is a real one, at no point has the Court ever dem-
onstrated that all or most campaign contributions are made as part of
such an arrangement. The Court in Nixon and Bucley appears to
have proceeded on an analysis similar to the tort doctrine of res ipsa
1 See Buck/e, 424 U.S. at 27, n.28 (noting "the deeply disturbing ecamples surfacing after
the 1972 election"); Nixon, 120 S. Ct. at 906 (quoting Buddley).
'6' Sorauf, supra note 57, at 1351, n.17.
Ni7 'on, 120 S. Ct. at 906.
16 The Court in Nixon pointed to a newspaper report questioning the state treasurer's deci-
sion to use a certain bank for most of Missouri's banking business after the bank had contrib-
uted $20,000 to the treasurer's campaign. Nixon, 120 S. CT at 907. However, at no point did
the Court cite any evidence of an improper quid pro quo in the case.
169 1&
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loquitur, which provides that in certain negligence cases a plaintiffs
showing of the end result is enough to allow a jury to find it more
likely than not that defendant's negligence caused that result.'7 In
the context of political contributions, the Court appears to assume
that the very act of contributing makes a finding of corrupt quid pro
quo more likely than not. But the Court fails to recognize that there
will often exist legitimate purposes for contributions, such as ideo-
logical compatibility. Given the First Amendment implications of
contribution limits, it is at best unclear why the Court is so ready to
assume the validity of the more incriminating inference.
More importantly, there is absolutely no reason that preexisting
bribery statutes do not adequately handle whatever problem exists. A
corrupt quid pro quo arrangement, under which an office holder
employs official power to aid an individual in exchange for a benefit,
would seem to be a classic example of illegal bribery.' Use of con-
tribution limits to prevent such arrangements, then, is little more
than a gratuitous inhibition on free speech rights. Moreover, to the
extent it was decided that bribery statutes do not, for some reason,
adequately protect against such illegal arrangements, there exists al-
ternative measures that can prophylactically deal with the problem
and that are considerably less invasive of First Amendment interests.
For example, government could prohibit any contributor to a candi-
date from receiving a contract from that candidate once in office.
Such a law would certainly invade free speech rights considerably less
than a sweeping restriction on all contributions. Such "unlimited"
limitations employ an axe, when the First Amendment demands use
of a scalpel.
It should be recalled, however, that the Court made reference to
concern over the appearance of corruption, as well as the actual exis-
tence of corruption, as a constitutionally acceptable justification for
contribution limits. Presumably, this concern would lead a reviewing
court to uphold such limits, even in the absence of any evidence ei-
ther that corruption is a real concern or that contribution limits
would avoid that concern more effectively than less invasive alterna-
tives. All that would be required, it would seem, is a public percep-
tion that such problems exist. Such an approach is problematic, for
two reasons. First, there has been no empirical showing that the pub-
1-0 E.g., Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1913):
[I]t is recognized that there is a class of cases where the circumstances of the occurrence
that has caused the injury are of a character to give ground for a reasonable inference
that if due care had been employed by the party charged... the thing that happened
amiss would not have happened. In such cases it is said, res ipsa loquitur-the thing
speaks for itself.
E.g., United States v. Biaggi, 674 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding defendant's co n-
viction while noting that, "[d]ictionary definitions in the main support the defendants' position
that the common meaning of the word bribery is the giving of a thing of value corruptly and
with intent to influence a specific official act").
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lic actually perceives such a problem. Although scholars have pointed
to "massive non-voting" as "[a] predictable consequence of a loss of
faith in democracy,"" the reasons for non-voting are sufficiently
complex that they render such an assumption overly simplistic.I
Second, in no other case of speech regulation has the Court been
willing to accept evidence of public perception of a compelling inter-
est, rather than existence of the interest itself, tojustify restrictions on
expression. To pander to public perceptions, regardless of their ac-
curacy, is to paternalistically resign oneself to the public's ignorance.
In Nixon, the Court noted that it had previously "recognized a
concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but [one also] ex-
tending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the
wishes of large contributors.' 714 But at no point did the Court in ei-
ther Buckley or Nixon fully explain in what sense, short of out-and-out
bribery, contributions undermine American democracy.
Scholars have sought to fill this void, by focusing on the concerns
of "excessive or undesirable influence."'m Professor Neuborne articu-
lates the concern in the following manner:
A campaign financing system driven by extreme wealth disparity will in-
evitably reflect the needs and concerns of the persons who pay for the
system, and it will ignore the needs and concerns of persons who lack the
means to participate in the funding process .... [TIhe political agenda
will inevitably be shaped by an estimate of the money that donors will
spend to promote a particular idea. This means that issues of impor-
tance to the holders of great wealth are more like,) to find themselves on
the agenda than issues of importance to the poor.
In the words of another commentator:
The issues that animated reform then and that animate reform now are
the issues of healthy politics in the processes of representative democ-
racy. These issues concern the concentrations of political influence that
money can buy, the undermining of competitiveness, and thus of mean-
ingful choice, in our elections, and the impoverishment of political de-
bate and information. 17
The goal of reform, then, is to "return to the populist dream of grass-
roots, direct political action by ordinary people." The argument,
then, comes down to the following points: The undue influence of
money (1) simultaneously fosters the implementation of the political
program of the rich and hinders implementation of the political pro-
gram of the poor; (2) alienates the common person from participa-
172 Neuborne, supra note 4, at 1073 (suggesting that a loss in faith results in non voting bc-
cause voters give up on a process that appears to be bought and paid for by the very rich).
113 E.g.,JACKC. DOPPELT& ELLENSHEARER, NoxvoTERs: AME.RIcA'S No-SHO"W (1999).
174 120 S. Ct. at 905.
1 Sorauf, supra note 57, at 1351.
1.6 Neuborne, supra note 4, at 1072.
07 Sorauf, supra note 57, at 1351.
178 I& at 1356.
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don in the democratic process; and (3) ultimately impoverishes the
quality of political debate.
This "undue influence" rationale for campaign finance regulation
is extremely troublesome from the perspective of First Amendment
theory on several grounds. Initially, the argument is much too sim-
plistic in its assumption that a speaker's superior economic power will
necessarily equal greater political success for the speaker's platform
and positions. If this were the case, it would be extremely difficult to
explain all of the pro-labor, regulatory, or redistributive legislation
enacted over the last seventy years. Indeed, if this were so, the goal of
enacting meaningful campaign finance regulation would be hopeless,
since by hypothesis legislators would respond to the wishes of the
economically powerful elements of society. The reality appears to be
that legislative decisions derive from a synthesis of a number of dif-
ferent factors, rather than a mechanistic reaction to superior eco-
nomic forces. 79
One need not necessarily believe that legislators act out of well in-
tentioned assessments of the public interest to conclude that the
economically powerful will not always get their way. Several alterna-
tive explanations also exist. First, one might reason that those with-
out economic power have been sufficiently resourceful so as to coun-
teract the political force of economic power. They have done this
through reliance on organizational skills, political effort, and the
pooling of economic resources. Thus, labor, environmentalist, and
pro-choice groups have been able to influence legislative choices, de-
spite their general lack of individual wealth. Second, it is conceivable
that legislators seek to pressure economically powerful forces for con-
tributions by adopting anti-capitalist legislation."" This legislative in-
centive would be removed if the possibility of large economic support
were taken away.
More importantly, the legitimacy of the very concern with the ef-
fect of speech regulation on the interests of the poor may be ques-
tioned from the perspective of First Amendment theory. Such an ap-
proach views free expression as nothing more than a device to be
manipulated in order to achieve predetermined normative political
agendas. On this basis alone, the argument must be rejected.
The concern that the dominance of economic power has alien-
ated significant portions of the electorate is, of course, a very differ-
ent type of argument. However, the issue of alienation from the po-
litical sphere is a complex question that has been the subject of
179 See ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIvE DEMOCRACY: PROCESS, PARriC-
PATION, AND POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 157 (1998) ("Legislators base their decisions on
information and cues that come from many sources.").
Bo See FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
181 Similar strategic uses of the First Amendment have already been seen in other works. E.g.,
Neuborne, supra note 4.
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careful scholarly discussion for many years.' It would be far too fac-
ile-especially when First Amendment rights are at stake-to assume
that the influence of economic power has alienated the electorate.
More importantly, it is unclear why public reaction should determine
the extent of First Amendment protection in the context of campaign
finance regulation, any more than it does in any other area of First
Amendmentjurisprudence. The Supreme Court has isely held that
the negative emotional impact of expression cannot justi, govern-
ment's suppression of that expression.' To structure First Amend-
ment protection to reflect the rising and falling emotional impact of
expression effectively allows a heckler's veto, where the speaker's
rights are determined by the extent to which the listeners are pleased
with the substance of her speech. Surely, no meaningful First
Amendment protection can survive under such a system. Yet the ar-
gument that expressive expenditures may be constitutionally limited
because such expenditures alienate the voting public is not signifi-
cantly different from such an unacceptable doctrinal framework.
CONCLUSION
The current state of doctrinal and theoretical confusion concern-
ing the First Amendment limitations on campaign finance regulation
did not come about over night. It arose as a result of the combina-
tion of years of poorly reasoned Supreme Court decisions and consti-
tutional scholarship often influenced either by strategic political
agendas or an underlying commitment to the value of economic re-
distribution.
The doctrinal and theoretical confusion that has plagued this area
of First Amendment jurisprudence, however, can be eliminated by
use of a process that combines logical reduction and political decon-
struction. The constitutional defense of campaign finance regulation
can, I believe, be reduced to six normative and empirical postulates.
Careful analysis and critique of the logic and empirical assumptions
underlying those postulates reveals their fundamental flaws. The goal
of this Article has been to do just that.
No amount of conceptual manipulation or empirical fudging can
alter the key fact that the restriction of campaign spending and con-
tributions inevitably causes a significant reduction in the extent and
availability of expression concerning performance of the fundamen-
1 See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAnE AND REVIwL. OF A.IiERIN
CommuNTfY (2000). Many years ago, scholars developed theories of democratic elitism, which
recognized the general alienation of the public at large. See, e.g., JOSEPH SCHL'tPETER.
QAPrAism, SocIAuSM, AND DEMOCRAcY (1942). In 1967, political scientist Peter Bachrach
recognized the widespread existence of alienation from the political sphere, ,and sought to re-
define the concept of "political" to include such new areas as the corporate workplace. See
PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEioCRATIC ETIS.I (1967).
183 Falwell v. Flynt, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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tal function of a democratic system: the electoral process. To be
sure, not all of that expression will be rational or well motivated. But
the First Amendment does not permit government to suppress ex-
pression because of its judgment that the speech is harmful, irra-
tional, or unwise. Moreover, by their nature, limits on campaign fi-
nance in no way assure that the expression suppressed will be any
more harmful or maliciously motivated than the expression that re-
mains.
One may reasonably argue that basic considerations of fairness
dictate the need for redistribution of economic resources. If gov-
ernment wishes to impose such a redistributive structure, nothing in
the First Amendment will disrupt attainment of that socio-economic
goal. But quite obviously not everyone agrees with such an economic
philosophy. To restructure the expressive system on the basis of such
a normative commitment would inevitably contravene the very value
of neutrality that underlies that system.
Restrictions on campaign expenditures and contributions fron-
tally assault the right of free expression. They therefore violate the
First Amendment. When one steps back and examines the question
free of the baggage of unsupported empirical assumptions, normative
economic philosophy, and underlying political agendas, this conclu-
sion is surprisingly easy to reach.
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